The Relevance (and Irrelevance) of Questions of Personhood (and Mindedness) to the Abortion Debate
David Kyle Johnson
Vol. 1, No. 2
Fall 2019
Pages: 121-153
DOI: 10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.02
More from the Author
Abstract
Social Issues: Abortion
David Kyle Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, Mindedness, Sapience, Sentience, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice, Self-awareness, Roe v. Wade
Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way.